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Discussion after the Speeches of Alan B. Morrison
and Andrew J. Roman
QUESTION, Mr. Stayin: We have heard about the differences between
the Canadian and U.S. legal systems. The Canadians do not have a con-
tingent fee system, they do not have juries and they do not have punitive
damages. Can you assess the implications, from a Canadian perspective,
of such differences in the legal system?
ANSWER, Mr. Roman: Because Canadians are not subjected to spec-
tacular damage awards and contingent fees, one of the consequences is
that the average income of Canadian lawyers is probably a lot lower than
lawyers in the United States. Such things as insurance premiums for
doctors are also a lot lower. As it works its way through the economy, a
number of ripple effects are felt. Similarly, since Canadians are not ac-
customed to punitive damages, they do not expect them. As for protec-
tion from product defects, it must be recognized that the same products
are sold on both sides of the border; maybe the Canadians are getting a
free ride. The United States brings all the cases and the two countries
have essentially uniform standards.
Canadians are perhaps less likely to aggressively pursue individual
damages. The U.S. system is much more judicialized which may account
for that difference. In Canada, consumer groups are co-opted to work
with bureaucrats and industries and various task forces in setting stan-
dards. Admittedly, there is a large element of government paternalism in
all of this, which may be explained by an economies of scale analysis. In
the long run, drafting regulations is a cheaper solution than litigating to
get the law changed.
The United States has Congressmen or Senators who are individual
legislators. This contrasts with the members of the Canadian Parliament
who are essentially constituency ombudsman. The Canadian govern-
ment is essentially run out of the Prime Minister's office. As a result, if
somebody in a Cabinet Minister's office or in the Prime Minister's office
can be persuaded, the law can be changed without having to persuade
fifty-one Senators to vote for it. In that sense, the Canadian political
system is much more centralized.
COMMENT, Mr. Robinson: There are things in Canada which the
United States would not tolerate. Canada has socialized medicine, where
the doctors work for the government and where the government deter-
mines what doctors will be paid. Likewise, the CRTC decides what the
rates will be for the phone company. The National Energy Board in
effect decides what customers will pay for gas. Canada is much more
socialized, organized, run by our governments and government agencies,
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and we allow that to happen. That is one of the reasons why, perhaps,
the Canadian consumer does not feel the need to pursue aggressive civil
litigation.
QUESTION, Mr. Castel: Have either of the speakers ever experienced a
situation in which consumers intervened in anti-dumping or counter-
vailing duty cases to lower the duties?
ANSWER, Mr. Morrison: Unlike Canada, in the United States, such
cases are not readily funded. They are extraordinarily complicated and
we do not enter them at the administrative level or at the court level.
This is partially because we have surrogates, in the sense that the import-
ers and the domestic companies are large entities fighting it out between
themselves. They have more resources than we do to achieve the same
ends.
The other reason is we simply do not receive intervening funding. It
is an area that we cannot hope to do anything in without expert wit-
nesses. Another problem is access to the data. That is to say, there is a
tremendous problem with secrecy of data in these kind of proceedings,
and the last people they will give data to is us.
COMMENT, Mr. Roman: My experience is quite different. I inter-
vened in a hearing before the Anti-Dumping Tribunal. The issue in-
volved blood. We were very concerned that if somebody was artificially
keeping the price of blood up by creating an unnecessary anti-dumping
case, this would work to the disadvantage of consumers. The procedures
before the Anti-Dumping Tribunal take virtually everything in camera.
The tribunal admits attorneys as long as they put a drop of blood in oath
signature, and if they disclose anything they learned, even in their sleep,
they will roast in hell forever or be disbarred, whichever comes first.
COMMENT, Mr. Barutciski: I am from the Bureau of Competition Pol-
icy in Ottawa. But I do have a background in trade remedies in Canada.
The second stage of any anti-dumping inquiry, being the material injury
inquiry, has not allowed public interest issues to come to the floor. In
Canada at least, with the passing of the Special Import Measures Act,
there is a possibility of public interest inquiry after the material injury
finding. So there will be opportunities in the future scope of public inter-
est groups, as well as other downstream users of the effected product, to
request a public interest hearing.
The problem with this provision is that the International Trade Tri-
bunal, which is the equivalent to the United States ITC, has the power
only to recommend to the Minister of Finance that the anti-dumping or
countervailing duty be reduced. The Minister may or may not do so as
he sees fit.
QUESTION, Mr. O'Grady: I want to add to Mr. Roman's discussion
regarding the regulated industry sector in Canada. We thought for an
effective regulatory policy could not be run unless practical steps were
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taken to have consumer groups present their evidence. Some sort of list
before the tribunal is needed in order to get an effective review of the
evidence and an appropriate result.
That theory seems to be sound. Although to some extent, as the last
speaker indicated, the parties who have a more specific interest are pres-
ent and they therefore sometimes preempt a lot of the subject area. For
example, in an oil rate hearing, the rates of Trans-Canada pipeline may
be at issue. But opposition may also be mounted by distributer compa-
nies who have their own axes to grind and are also present.
In any event, Mr. Morrison appears to indicate that in Washington,
before the Federal Regulatory Tribunal, there is almost no funding for
that kind of intervention. I wonder whether you think it is possible to
make those regulatory agencies work properly without the funding.
ANSWER, Mr. Morrison: In the last twelve to fifteen years the United
States has substantially deregulated the economy. As a result, there are
fewer decisions regarding the economy compared to the health and safety
sectors by Federal Regulatory agencies, particularly those who deal di-
rectly with the consumer.
Also, some of the regulatory decisions that are made create tension.
Before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, there are natural an-
tagonisms between the transportation industry and the users and between
the end users and the shippers that create the kind of internal tension
seem in the anti-dumping and countervailing duty areas that provided
substitutes for consumer intervention.
Third, some of the regulatory agencies are better than others in rep-
resenting the consumer. The big problem with the regulatory agencies
used to be their adversarial relationships with industry. This changed in
the late 1960s. Now regulatory capture by industry is a far worse prob-
lem than regulatory overzealousness.
Consumer groups made two efforts to find ways for consumers to be
represented. Two proposals did not succeed in the Congress. The first
proposal provided a Federal Consumer Protection Advocacy Organiza-
tion within the federal government funded by federal taxpayer dollars.
The actual job of this agency would be to send lawyers, economists, ex-
perts into consumer-effected administrative proceedings to bring about a
consumer influence. The last time it was seriously considered by Con-
gress was in 1978.
The second proposal was to try to provide intervenor funding,
money taken out of the regulatory budget to go out on a competitive bid
basis to get consumer groups to replace some internal staff functions.
The groups would be funded and able to have their expert witnesses paid,
and they would know in advance that they would get the money. There
were two problems. First, some agencies tried to use money out of their
own budgets. This conduct was ruled in one case to be unlawful in that
the agencies did not have the authority to spend that money. That prob-
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lem became moot in 1980 when the Reagan administration decided not
to spend money for that purpose, whether they were allowed to under the
appropriations or not. Second, the attempt to pass generic legislation
appropriating money for those purposes was also defeated. Only small
amounts of money were appropriated in a few statutes. Those, by and
large, have all been used up. While there is a very small amount of
money in certain adjudicator procedures, it is rear-end money as opposed
to front-end money.
As far as state consumer protection officers are concerned, several
states employ them principally in utilities, such as telephone, electrical,
and gas. Participating states have a people's counsel, who represents the
states in utilities matters. However, there counsels are relatively narrow
in their function.
Finally, the United States attempted to organize Citizen Utility
Boards (CUBs), although this effort has proven largely unsuccessful.
Under CUBs individuals would, upon receiving their bill from the tele-
phone company, be given the option to pay an additional five or two
dollars to fund consumer advocacy organizations. Although the money
would not come out of the telephone company's budget, the telephone
companies rejected the idea of sending contribution messages to consum-
ers. In one case, the Supreme Court held that one of the messages
drafted in California violated the First Amendment rights of the utility.
It did not seem that the First Amendment referred to rights of utilities
not to send messages in their bills.
Continued efforts are being made in this area to deal with the "free
ride" problem. Any resolution must be economically efficient to enable
the organization to have a viable impact on the problem. However, eve-
rybody is prepared to have somebody else fund this consumer organiza-
tion. Until such responsibility and aggressive action is taken, a solution
seems unlikely.
Vol. 17:393 1991
4
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 17 [1991], Iss. 2, Art. 24
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol17/iss2/24
